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LLOYD mu\:'.•':H and 
JEANNE "::'._1c.:.::H, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
WESTERN 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
PETROLEUM, INC., ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant.) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 17178 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE 
Respondents brought this action claiming damages for 
the alleged pollution of their water well by formation 
water percolating into the underground water system from the 
Appellant's evaporation pit. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury which found that the De-
fendant's use of a formation water disposal pit was negli-
gent nnd that the water from Defendant's pit had caused 66% 
of the pollution of the Plaintiffs' first well and 52% of 
the pollution of the Plaintiffs' second well. The remaining 
pollution was found to have been caused by other parties or 
conditions. The jury awarded general and special damages to l the Plaintiffs together with a $13,000.00 punitive damage Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
award. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPSAL 
Appellant seeks to have this court remand the case for 
a new trial; or in the alternative, to apportion the damages 
awarded and to delete or reduce the punitive damage award. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, Branches, filed this action al-
leging that formation water from the Defendant's evaporation 
pit had run onto the Plaintiffs' land causing damage to the 
Plaintiffs, and that the formation water had percolated into 
the underground water system causing the water in the Plain-
tiffs' water wells to become unfit for culinary use, causing 
damages including a decrease in the value of the Plaintiffs' 
land. 
The Plaintiffs are the purchasers of a parcel of pro-
perty located in a rural area North of Roosevelt, Utah. The 
property was purchased in December of 1976 at a purchase 
price of $37,000.00. (T.17,163) On the property is a home 
occupied by the Plaintiffs. Water for the use of the home 
at the time of purchase was obtained from a well which had 
been drilled sometime prior to 1930. (T.17-18) In November 
of 1977, Plaintiffs drilled a new well next to their home to 
obtain water for household use. (T.32) 
The land North of the Plaintiffs' property, is owned by 
·-7- ... 
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the Defendant. Prior to the time Plaintiffs purchased their 
property, Defendant maintained on its land a pit into uhich 
was placed formation waters. The Defendant's business 
consists of hauling formation waters from oil well sites 
and discharging that water into the pit for disposal. 
Formation water is underground water brought to the surface 
by producing oil wells. The use of evaporation pits to 
dispose of formation water is an accepted procedure in the 
oil industry. (T.170-171) 
The Plaintiffs allege that soon after they moved into 
the home the water from the older well started to taste bad. 
It was their opinion that the water was being contaminated 
by water percolating from the evaporation pit into the 
underground water supply. Tests made of the water in Plain-
tiffs' well showed that it contained fluctuating amounts of 
minerals. The Plaintiffs then drilled a new well in Novem-
ber of 1977, obtaining good water. Plaintiffs alleged that 
after about two (2) months the water in the new well also 
started to taste bad. 
In an attempt to ascertain whether the formation water 
in the Defendant's evaporation pit was contaminating the 
Plaintiffs' culinary water supply, the parties by agreement 
performed certain tests. Results of the tests failed to 
show that the water from the evaporation pit was contami-
nating the Plaintiffs' water supply. (T.45, 56 and 362) 
The parties also retained experts to study the geological 
-3-
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and underground water systems to determine whether the 
Plaintiffs' wells were being contaminated by the Defendant's 
evaporation pits or by other sources. One of those experts 
was Edward Ferris who made an extensive study of the under-
ground water system and presented to the court and the jury 
his conclusions. (T.337) 
Mr. Ferris' study showed that the naturally occurring 
underground water in the area around the Branch home consisted 
of two (2) sources. The first layer of underground water 
was referred to as "shallow ground water", which water was 
not suitable for culinary use. Some of the water from De-
fendant's pit was percolating into this natural shallow 
ground water. (T.345) The deeper source of underground 
water was referred to as the Duchesne Formation aquifer. 
This aquifer was pressurized and contained waters suitable 
for human consumption, but of substandard quality. Several 
homes in the area used water from this aquifer for culinary 
purposes. (T.453-55) 
Mr. Ferris testified that the water in the Plaintiffs' 
old well was contaminated as a result of the casing having 
rusted away over the years. (T.342 and 345) As a result of 
the casing rusting away, extremely poor quality shallow 
ground water was entering the well through the casing thereby 
contaminating the suitable water in the well. Because of 
the rusted casing, the water from the old well would have 
been of substandard quality even if the Defendant's disposal 
-4-
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pit hacl not been in existence. (T.347) Even with the Defrn-
dant's pit, the contamination in the old well was 75 percent 
caused by the natural poor quality groundwater and only 25 
percent from water percolating from the evaporation pit. 
(T. 456-58) 
The study on the new well showed that if it was prop-
erly drilled and cased into the Duchesne Formation aquifer 
it was impossible for water from the Defendant's disposal 
pit to e~ter it. (T.454-458) The water samples from the new 
well showed that in fact the new well had not been contami-
natetl by the Defendant's evaporation pit, but rather con-
tained only water found in the Duchesne Formation aquifer 
which, in its nacural state, is of substandard quality. 
(T.Lf55) 
Testimony of the various witnesses was that any contam-
ination of the Plaintiffs' well could come from several 
sources including natural salts contained in the earth, 
(T. 128, 450), improper casing of the wells, (T. 3lf2), the 
septic tank system of the Plaintiffs located near the wells 
(T. 68), and activities of third parties which may affect 
the underground water system. 
The case was submitted to the jury in the form of 
sp~cial interrozatocies. The court instructed the jury 
reg~rding negli3ence and the standard of care of a rea-
sonably prudent person. It refused, however, to instruct 
the jury as to proximate cause as requested by the Defen-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administ red by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dant. (Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions !l.94) The 
trial court also had the jury find the percentage of pollu-
tion of the Plaintiffs' well caused by the Defendant and the 
percentage of pollution caused by other parties or conditions. 
The court, however, refused to submit to the jury the question 
of the percentage of negligence attributable to each party 
as requested by the Defendant and as required by Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-38. (Special Interrogatories R.140) The jury, 
in reply to the question on percentage of causation, found 
that in relation to the Plaintiffs' first well, the De-
fendant had caused 66 percent of the pollution and other 
parties or conditions 34 percent of the pollution. In 
relation to the Plaintiffs' new well, the jury found the De-
fendant had caused 52 percent of the pollution, and other 
parties or conditions 48 percent of the pollution. (R.147-
151) The court, however, refused to reduce the amount of 
damages found by the jury by the percentage of pollution 
caused by other parties. The court awarded to the Plaintiffs 
$3,250.00 for the decrease in value of their property; $700.00 
for costs of water tests, surveying, etc.; $3,000.00 for the 
cost of drilling the new well; $13,000.00 for punitive 
damages; and $10,000.00 for inconvenience, annoyance and 
mental suffering. (R.270) T~e $10,000.00 award for incon-
venience, annoyance and mental suffering was deleted by the 
court for the reason that it had not been pled nor proven, 
nor had the jury been properly instructed on that issue. 
-6-
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(R.259,27n) Th2 court, how2ver, refused to delete or 
reduce the award of punitive damages. 
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POINT I 
WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH 
NEGLIGENCE THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED 
TO AN INSTRUCTION REGARDING PROXIMATE 
CAUSE AND A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT 
THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENT ACTIONS WERE 
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' 
INJURIES. 
The legal issues arising out of the alleged pollution 
of underground water systems through the operation of pits 
to dispose of formation waters, have not previously been 
considered by the Utah Supreme Court, insofar as counsel can 
determine. Those issues have been considered, however, by 
states such as Oklahoma and Texas which have had extensive 
oil well development and where the use of pits is a coI'1l!lon 
practice in disposing of formation waters. In the juris-
dictions which have considered similar cases, the courts 
have held that the plaintiff must base its case for recovery 
either on the theory of nuisance or negligence and in a few 
jurisdictions the theory of trespass has been allowed. 
General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken 344 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1961), 
Ross v. Fink 378 P.2d 1011 (Okla. 1963), Turner v. Big Lake 
Oil Co. 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936), United Fuel 
Gas Co. v. Sa-wyers 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ken. 1951), 38 A.L.R.2d. 
1261, 1285 and 39 A.L.R.3d. 910, 921. 
The verdict found by the jury and the judgment of the 
trial court in this case -were apparently based on the 
theory of negligence. The trial court instructed the jury 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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.. 
. , '-'' rt'-'2,l i.:~c·t1c2 2nd there' \"dS a fincli0g by the jury that 
the Defendant had been negligent in dumping formation water 
in the evaporation pit. (Jury Instructions Numbers 6, 7 and 
8 and· Interrogatory Number 17, R. 116-139) Since the Plain.,-
tiffs did not claim that their theory was based on nuisance 
or trespass and furthermore, since the Plaintiffs did not re-
quest the trial court to instruct the jury as to nuisance 
or trespass, those theories were waived by the Plaintiffs and 
could not have been.used by the trial court or the jury in 
reaching its verdict. Therefore, the only accepted theory 
upon which this case could be based is negligence. 
The trial court instructed the jury as to negligence, 
but it refused to instruct the jury as to proximate cause as 
requested by the Defendant. Proximate cause is a question of 
fact for the jury and not an issue to be decided by the court. 
Rallow_:Y_,__Ogd~n_ City 66 Utah 475,243 P. 791 (1926). As stated 
in llaar std.ck v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. 70 Utah 552, 262 
P. 100 (1927), 
[I)t is a fundamental principal of the law of negligence 
that no matter how gross the negligence complained of 
may be, it creates no liability unless it is the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Id. at 559. 
In cases involving the alleged pollution of water 
wells, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the 
defendant's negligence is the proximate cause of the pol-
lution of the Plaintiffs' well and the resulting damages. 
l\ai_12 __ \!-._~~- 293 P. 2d 359 (Okla. 1956), SunRay Mid-
Continental Oil Co. v. Tisdale 366 P.2d 614 (Okla. 1961) . Spo sored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Fun ing for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The trial court's refusal to instruct che> j 1:r; o:-i 
proximate cause was error. This error was not corrected 
by requesting the jury to find whether the Defendant's use 
of the disposal pit was a cause of the pollution of the 
water in Plaintiffs' well. (R.136,Question No. 2 and R. 
138, Question No. 7) The jury's answers to those questions 
are not meaningful when one must apply the answers in 
trying to formulate a judgment which requires that one's 
negligence be the proximate cause of the harm. 
In some cases, a cause and proximate cause would be 
synonymous. However, in the instant case that is not true. 
The testimony at the trial showed that there were several 
possible causes of the pollution of the Plaintiffs' well, 
including poor subsurface ground water, rusted casings, the 
Plaintiffs' septic tank system, and unknown third parties. 
The jury also found that there were other causes of the 
pollution of the well. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs them-
selves, in a separate lawsuit, sued the person who drilled 
the well, claiming that he was the cause of the pollution of 
the well. (R. 206-07) 
Because there was evidence indicating that there were 
several possible causes of the pollution of the Plaintiffs' 
well, it was imperative that the jury be instructed on 
proximate cause and be allowed to make a factual deterPJina-
tion of that issue. The Court's refusal to instruct the 
-lCJ-
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jury on proximate cause and the failure: .of the jury to fin'l 
that the Defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the 
Plaintiffs' injury, is not in accordance ~1ith the established 
law of this jurisdiction or other jurisdictions. Both 
precedent and reason support a reversal of the verdict in 
this case and a remand for a new trial. 
-11-
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POIN'.l II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO DIRECT 
THE JURY TO FIND THE PERCENTAGE OF 
NEGLIGENCE ATTRIBUTABLE TO EACH PARTY 
AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-
38 WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The comparative negligence statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-
27-38 provides that, 
The Court may, and when requested by any party, 
shall, direct the jury to find separate special ver-
dicts determining ... (2) the percentage of negligence 
attributable to each party; and the Court shall then 
reduce the amount of the damages in propJrtion to the 
amount of negligence attributable to the person seeking 
recovery. (Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the Defendant requested the trial 
court to direct the jury to find separate special verdicts 
determining the percentage of negligence attributable to 
each party. (Plaintiffs' Proposed Verdict Form, R.113) The 
trial court, however, refused the request to find the per-
centage of negligence attributable to each party. Instead 
it instructed the jury to determine (1) whether the Defen-
dant was negligent "in dumping formation water in its evapo-
ration pit." (R.139, Question No. 17) and (2) the percentage 
of the pollution of Plaintiffs' well caused by the Defen-
dant' s dumping and the percentage caused by third par--
ties. The trial court refused to instruct the jury to 
determine whether the Plaintiffs were negligent and if so, 
the percent of negligence attributable to the Plaintiffs. 
The evidence showed that the Plaintiffs or their agents may 
-12- i 
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lHve been neL;ligent in the maintainence of the casings of 
the wells ~~J that the Plaintiffs' septic tank system may 
hnve contributed to the pollution of the well. It is pos-
s.Lule that the jury, if asked, could have found Plaintiffs 
mo-ce negli<;en t than Defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 specifically requires that the 
Court direct the jury to enter separate verdicts as to the 
percent of negligence attributable to each party. The trial 
court's failure to instruct the jury makes it impossible for 
the couri: to use the interrogatories answered by the jury as 
a basis for the judgment. Therefore, a new trial should be 
granted so that the jury can be properly instructed and 
proper questions submitted to the jury relating to the per-
centage of negligence attributable to each party. 
-P-
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POINT III 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE TRIAL COURT'S FAIL-
URE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO FIND THE 
PERCENTAGE OF NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS AND APPORTION THE DA."1AGES, THE 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST RE-
DUCED THE DAMAGES BY THE PERCENTAGE 
OF POLLUTION FOUND BY THE JURY TO BE 
CAUSED BY OTHER PARTIES OR CONDITIONS. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37 and Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 
require that the damages be reduced by the proportion of 
neglige~ce attributable to the party seeking recovery. 
Not having the requisite finding by the jury to formu-
late the judgment in accordance with Utah Statute, the Court 
should have followed the common law rule of apportionment. 
The rule is that if an independent tort-feaser pollutes 
a water supply, damages are apportioned according to the 
percent of pollution attributable to that party. Monroe 
Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co. 240 Mich. 279, 215 
N.W. 325 (1927). As stated in R. Clark, Water and Water 
Rights, §219.3(B), 
The division of apportionable harm among several 
defendants is undoubtedly based upon considerations of 
fairness. It seems wrong to hold a defendant liable 
for the entire damages where it is known that he is 
responsible for only a part. Whatever apportionment is 
permitted by the nature of the case, although inexact, 
is usually better than no apportionment at all .... Id. 
at 186. 
In the present case, the trial court did ask the jury 
to find the percent of pollution caused by the DefendRnt and 
the percent of the pollution caused by other parties or 
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condi tiuns. Th2 jury, in response to those questions, found 
that the Defendant had caused 66/'o of the pollution of Plain-
tiffs' old well with other parties or conditions causing 
34% of the pollution in that well. The jury further found 
that the Defendant had caused 52% of the pollution of the 
Plaintiffs' new well and that other parties or conditions 
had caused 48% of the pollution of that well. (R.147-151) 
Since the trial court failed to instruct the jury to 
find the percentage of negligence attributable to the Plain-
tiffs, it was impossible to apportion the damages found by 
the jury as required by Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37. Not only 
did the Court not apportion the damages according to the 
negligence of the parties, it failed to reduce the damage 
award against Defendant by the percentage pollution the jury 
found caused by parties other than Defendant. Fairness and 
precedent require that the damages be reduced by the percent 
of pollution attributable to others so that the Defendant is 
not required to pay for damages which were not caused by it. 
The trial court's refusal to apportion the damages, as found 
by the jury, was error, and the case should be remanded with 
instructions by this Court to apportion the damages in 
accordance with the findings of the jury. 
-15-
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POEJT IV 
THE ACTIONS OF THE DUCHESNE COUNTY 
CLERK'S OFFICE IN EXCUSING ALL PROS-
PECTIVE JURORS WHO DESIRED TO GO ELK 
HUNTING VIOLATED THE JURY SELECTION 
AND SERVICE ACT, AND THE DEFENDANT 
IS ENTITLED TO NEW TRIAL WITH A PROP-
ERLY SELECTED JURY OR A HEARING TO 
DETERMINE IF THE DEFENDANT WAS PREJU-
DICED. 
The procedure for qualification and selection of juries 
in the State of Utah is set forth in the Jury Selection and 
Service Act. Utah Code Ann. §78-46-1, et ~- Utah Code 
Ann. §78-46-13 provides that the clerk of the court, under 
the direction of the judge, shall draw a jury panel at 
random from the qualified jury wheel. The persons then 
selected for jury service are to be notified by the court 
when and where they are to report for service. Section 78-
46-15 provides that if a prospective juror desires to be 
excused from jury service, the court shall make that deter-
mination based upon the information provided on the jury 
qualification form or by an interview with the prospective 
juror. If it is determined that the juror should be ex-
cused, that should be entered on the jury qualification 
form. 
Section 78-46-16 sets forth the procedure by which a 
party challenges the selection of the jury. That Section 
provides that the challenge should be made within seven (7) 
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J~ys ~ftcr the party discovers the grounds for the challenge 
and in any event before the jury is sworn to try the case. 
Upon a motion filed setting forth a sworn statement of facts 
which if true would constitute a substantial failure to 
comply with the act, the moving party is entitled to present 
testimony on the question of whether the jury was properly 
selected and on the question of whether the moving party was 
prejudiced as a result of the improper selection of jury. 
The trial in this case was scheduled so as to include 
the opening day of elk hunting season in Utah. After the 
jury was sworn, passed for cause and impaneled and after the 
trial had started, counsel for the Defendant was informed by 
the Duchesne County Clerk's Office that since the opening 
day of elk season was the same day as the trial, the clerk's 
office had contacted all prospective jurors and inquired as 
to whether or not they desired to go elk hunting. (R.173) 
Any prospective jurors who expressed a desire to go elk 
hunting were then removed from the jury. list and not sum-
moned for jury duty. The Defendant was not aware of these 
facts prior to the time the jury was sworn, and, therefore, 
was unable to file a motion challenging the selection of the 
jury. However, on receipt of this information, Defendant 
filed, with the trial court, a motion requesting a new trial 
or a hearing to determine whether the jury selection was 
proper. If the determination was made that the jury selection 
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was not proper and the Defendant had been prejudiced, the 
Defendant should have been granted a new trial. The court 
denied the Defendant's motion and ·refused to hold a hearing 
or grant a new trial. 
The right of a party to be judged by a properly selected 
jury is an important facet of the American legal system. 
The excusing of all prospective jurors who desired to go elk 
hunting by the Duchesne County Clerk's Office deprived the 
Defendant of a proper jury leaving the Defendant with a 
jury composed of parties not familiar with the oil industry. 
The Defendant is at least entitled to a hearing to determine 
whether the jury selection was proper and if not, whether the 
Defendant was prejudiced. The failure of the trial court 
to grant such a hearing, or in the alternative to grant to 
the Defendant a new trial with a properly selected jury, was 
error and the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
-18-
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POINT V 
THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES BY THE 
JURY WITHOUT A SHOWING THAT THE DE-
FENDANT'S ACTIONS WERE WILLFUL AND 
HALICIOUS, WAS IMPROPER AND UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE 
AND THEREFORE THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE 
AWARD SHOULD BE DELETED OR AT LEAST 
REDUCED. 
Punitive damages must not be awarded unless the evidence 
shows that the defendant's actions were willful and malicious. 
Kesler v. Rogers 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975), Palombi v. D & C 
Builders 22 Utah 2d 297,452 P.2d 325 (1969), Powers v. 
Taylor 14 Utah 2d 152,309 P.2d 380, (1963), Smoot v. Lund 13 
Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962) and Evans v. Gaisford 122 
Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952). Punitive damages are not to 
be awarded if the conduct of the Plaintiff was just wrongful, 
Kesler v. Rogers at 356, or if the defendant's conduct was 
careless. Palombi v. D & C Builders at 328. The court in 
allowing punitive damages must do so with caution, lest 
engendered by passion or prejudice, the award becomes un-
realistic or unreasonable. Kesler v. Rogers at 359. As 
this Court has stated, 
[T]he damages so assessed must appear to have some 
basis in reason in relation to the wrongful act, the 
manner and intent with which it was done, the injury 
inflicted and the actual damage suffered. 
Powers v. Taylor at 383. 
In Kesler v. Rogers, this Court compared the $10,000.00 
punitive damage award to the $25,403.17 actual damage and 
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the wrongful taking by the defendant of plaintiff's cattle 
and held that the $10,000.00 punitive damage award was 
disproportionate to the actual damages and the injury caused 
and reduced the punitive damage award to $5,000.00. 
Lawsuits involving pollution of water systems by oil 
companies have often result in large punitive damage awards 
as a result of passion or prejudice, and the courts have 
felt compelled to either reduce or delete those damages. In 
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Merritt 332 P.2d 677 (Okla. 
1958), the court, in reviewing the actual damage suffered by 
the plaintiff, reduced the punitive damage awards from 
$500.00 to $200.00 and from $4,500.00 to $1,800.00. In 
Cooperative Refinery Ass'n. v. Young 393 P.2d 537 (Okla. 
1964), the court deleted from rhe judgment the $600.00 
punitive damage award on the basis that the defendant had 
not acted willfully and maliciously, but had acted in good 
faith. Furthermore, it has been held that in applying the 
doctrine of comparative negligence, the punitive damage 
award should be reduced by the percent of negligence attri-
butable to other parties. Pedernales Electric Cooperative, 
Inc. v. Schulz 583 S.W.2d. 882 (Tex. 1979). Contra. 
Tampa Electric Co. v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. (DC 
Fla.) 367 F.Supp 27. 
The Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence showing 
-20- I 
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that the actions of the Defendant were willful and malicious. 
Rather, the evidence showed that the Defendant's evaporation 
pit was in operation when the Plaintiffs first purchased 
their property, and that when the Plaintiffs complained to 
the Defendant claiming that their water well was being pol-
luted, the Defendant went to great lengths and expense to 
determine if the pit was the cause of any pollution. De-
fendant met with the Plaintiffs and agreed to institute a 
dye test and a water sampling test to determine whether the 
water in the evaporation pit was polluting the Plaintiffs' 
water system. Both of those tests failed to show that the 
water from Defendant's pit was polluting the Plaintiffs' 
well. In addition, the Defendant hired two (2) different 
experts in the field to run tests and to examine the geology 
of the area to determine whether or not the evaporation pit 
was polluting the Plaintiffs' well. The conclusion of both 
of those experts was that the Defendant was not polluting 
the Plaintiffs' water well, but rather the pollution was 
from some other source. In addition, the Defendant constructed 
catch ponds to prevent seepage from the pit from running 
onto the Plaintiffs' property and expended a great amount of 
money hauling water from the catch ponds so as to prevent 
the water from running onto the Plaintiffs' property. Even 
the Plaintiffs' counsel admitted in his closing arguments 
that the actions of the Defendant were not willful and 
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malicious, but were at best a reckless indifference for the 
Plaintiffs' rights. (T.502-03) 
The instruction given to the jury by the trial court 
was improper and not in accordance with Utah law in that it 
allowed the jury to assess punitive damages on a showing by 
the Plaintiffs that the Defendant's conduct was with reck-
less indifference and disregard of the rights of the Plain-
tiffs. It was this improper language in the instruction 
that the Plaintiffs' counsel relied on when arguing to the 
jury that punitive damages should be awarded. Since there 
was no showing that the befendant's actions were willful and 
malicious, the Defendant requested the court to instruct the 
jury that punitive damages were not allowed in this case. 
(T.398-99, and Defendant's Proposed Jury Instruction R.108) 
The court refused the proposed instruction by the Defendant. 
The court did, however, state to Defendant's counsel that it 
would instruct the jury that it could only award punitive 
damages if there was a showing that the action of the Defen-
dant was willful, malicious and wanton. (T.402-04, Lfl2 and 
414) However, when the court instructed the jury, it 
added the additional language relating to reckless indif-
ference and disregard. The jury instruction was erroneous, 
not in accordance with Utah law, and the punitive damage 
award should be deleted. 
In the event the Court determines that the punitive 
-22-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
damage award should not be deleted, the award should at 
least be reduced since it was obviously awarded under passion 
or prejudice. As noted supra, punitive damage awards under 
similar factual situations have shown that the verdicts 
awarded by the jury were under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. Furthermore, the trial court indicated in an 
earlier ruling that it considered the punitive damage award 
excessive when it reduced that award to $5,000.00, but later 
reinstated it when deleting the award for inconvenience, an-
noyance and mental suffering. (R.258) 
A comparison of the punitive damages of $13,000.00 to 
the actual damages awarded to the Plaintiffs of approximately 
$9,000.00, shows that the punitive damage award is dispro-
portionate to the injury and was awarded under passion or 
prejudice especially in light of the fact that the jury 
panel had been improperly selected. Fairness to the Defen-
dant requires that the punitive damages be deleted or at 
least reduced. 
-23-
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's failure to adequately instruct the 
jury regarding proximate cause and punitive damages and its 
failure to have the jury answer interrogatories to provide 
the necessary information needed to apply the law of negli-
gence and comparative negligence resulted in a meaningless 
jury verdict. It is in the best interest of the parties 
that this Court remand this case to the trial court with 
instructions regarding the correct law to be applied. A 
jury verdict which deciqes whether the Defendant's negli-
gence was the proximate cause rather than a cause of the 
Plaintiffs' injury, together with a finding regarding the 
percentage of negligence of the Plaintiffs, would allow the 
Court to enter a judgment fair to both parties. A new trial 
would also remove the question as to whether the Defendant 
received a fair trial due to the improper manner in which 
the jury was selected. 
In the event the Court does not remand the case for a 
new trial, justice requires a reduction in the damages 
awarded. The Defendant should not be required to pay for the 
damages attributable to pollution which the jury found to be 
caused by other parties and conditions, especially when the 
other parties could have been the Plaintiffs and the other 
conditions could have been the poor quality of the under-
round water in its natural state. 
Punitive damages should only be awarded when the Defen-
-24-
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dant's actions are wilful and malicious. The Plaintiffs' 
counsel in the closing arguments admitted that the Defen-
dant's actions were not wilful and malicious. The award of 
punitive damages by the jury resulted from the improper jury 
instruction and passion or prejudice. Such an award of 
punitive damages should be deleted or at least reduced. 
Appellant, therefore, submits that the jury verdict 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
1980. 
Respectfully submitted this 
~ 11 day of September, 
MCKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C. 
53 South 200 East 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
789-4908 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
Western Petroleum, Inc. 
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